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SLOWING THE RATES OF INNOVATION: 
HOW THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S BAN ON NO-
CHALLENGE CLAUSES IN PRE-LITIGATION 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS HINDERS 
BUSINESS GROWTH 
Abstract: On July 10, 2012, in Rates Technology Inc. v. Speakeasy, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that no-challenge clauses in 
pre-litigation settlement agreements are unenforceable. In its ruling, the 
court determined that sharing ideas and discovering invalid patents are 
policy considerations that supersede spurring innovation and settling liti-
gation. This Comment argues that spurring innovation and settling litiga-
tion are policy considerations better aligned with modern business. As a 
result, this Comment asserts that no-challenge clauses should be enforce-
able. 
Introduction 
 Patent law incentivizes innovation by granting inventors exclusive 
rights over their inventions for twenty years.1 Once this right is secured, 
inventors are able to recoup research and development costs by licens-
ing their innovations to third parties.2 When patent holders license 
their inventions, however, they run the risk that licensees will initiate 
litigation to challenge the patent’s validity.3 To protect themselves from 
this risk, patent holders may include a no-challenge clause in a settle-
ment agreement.4 No-challenge clauses protect the licensor’s patent by 
                                                                                                                      
1 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006 & Supp. V 2011); see Christina Bohannan & Herbert 
Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: Reformation and Harm, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 905, 918 (2010); Ro-
chelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Dethroning Lear: Licensee Estoppel and the Incentive to Innovate, 72 Va. 
L. Rev. 677, 679 (1986). Patent law derives its origin from the Constitution, which grants 
Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.” U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
2 See Dreyfuss, supra note 1, at 679–80. 
3 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Lawrence S. Pope, Dethroning Lear? Incentives to Inno-
vate After MedImmune, 24 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 971, 974–75 (2009); David M. Treadway, 
Comment, Has the Supreme Court Forgotten the Patentee? Recent Patent Licensing Decisions Con-
tradict Patent Policy, Harm Licensors, and Alter Negotiation, 33 U. Dayton L. Rev. 303, 303–04 
(2008). 
4 Christian Chadd Taylor, Note, No-Challenge Termination Clauses: Incorporating Innovation 
Policy and Risk Allocation into Patent Licensing Law, 69 Ind. L.J. 215, 236 n.137 (1993) (“No-
challenge clauses are license provisions which prevent licensees from challenging the validity 
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preventing the licensee from challenging the patent’s validity.5 Accord-
ingly, a no-challenge clause typically decreases the price for the license, 
which helps to explain why a licensee would agree to its terms.6 
 In 2012, in Rates Technology Inc. v. Speakeasy, Inc., the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit became the third circuit to hold no-
challenge clauses unenforceable pursuant to public policy.7 These cir-
cuits have expressed concern that no-challenge clauses effectively 
broaden the scope of patent protection by making it more difficult to 
challenge invalid patents.8 They reason that this broadening will result 
in the protection of ideas that rightfully should be in the public do-
main.9 In contrast, the Federal Circuit has diverged from this ap-
proach.10 In its decisions, the Federal Circuit has placed greater im-
portance on enforcing licensing agreements and encouraging freedom 
of contract between sophisticated parties negotiating at arms-length.11 
The inconsistency caused by this divide between courts regarding the 
enforceability of no-challenge clauses creates uncertainty that is prob-
lematic for modern business.12 
                                                                                                                      
of the licensed patent.”). In the patent context, parties frequently enter into licensing 
agreements only after an allegation of infringement by the patent owner. See Rates Tech. Inc. 
v. Speakeasy, Inc., 685 F.3d 163, 171 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 81 U.S.L.W. 3199 (U.S. Jan. 
14, 2013) (No. 12-402). Thus, patent owners “have a strong incentive to ‘couch licensing 
arrangements in the form of settlement agreements.’” Id. (quoting Massillon-Cleveland-
Acron Sign Co. v. Golden State Adver. Co. (MCA), 444 F.2d 425, 427 (9th Cir. 1971)). 
5 Richard Weil Goldstucker, Note, Stop the Bleeding: MedImmune Ends the Unjustified 
Erosion of Patent Holders’ Rights in Patent Licensing Agreements, 16 J. Intell. Prop. L. 137, 138 
(2008). Often, a licensee will challenge the licensor’s patent in an effort to avoid paying 
continuing royalties. See id. 
6 See id. 
7 685 F.3d at 172; see, e.g., Panther Pumps & Equip. Co. v. Hydrocraft, Inc., 468 F.2d 
225, 232 (7th Cir. 1972); MCA, 444 F.2d at 427; Bendix Corp. v. Balax, Inc., 421 F.2d 809, 
821 (7th Cir. 1970). 
8 See Rates, 685 F.3d at 172; MCA, 444 F.2d at 427. 
9 See Rates, 685 F.3d at 172; MCA, 444 F.2d at 427. 
10 See Baseload Energy, Inc. v. Roberts, 619 F.3d 1357, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Flex-Foot, 
Inc. v. CRP, Inc., 238 F.3d 1362, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The Federal Courts Improvement 
Act of 1982 established the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which has exclu-
sive jurisdiction over appeals from district court decisions that relate to patent issues. 28 
U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. V 2011); see Taylor, supra note 4, at 244. Congress cre-
ated the Federal Circuit to help make patent law more uniform and reduce regional cir-
cuits’ need to handle the specialized technical issues that often arise in patent law. See Tay-
lor, supra note 4, at 244. 
11 See Baseload, 619 F.3d at 1361; Flex-Foot, 238 F.3d at 1370. 
12 See M. Natalie Alfaro, Comment, Barring Validity Challenges Through No-Challenge Clauses 
and Consent Judgments: Medimmune’s Revival of the Lear Progeny, 45 Hous. L. Rev. 1277, 1308 
(2008); Goldstucker, supra note 5, at 155; Treadway, supra note 3, at 303. The inclusion (or 
noninclusion) of a no-challenge clause greatly affects the terms of the settlement or licensing 
agreement. See Treadway, supra note 3, at 324. Licensors are more willing to accept continu-
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 Part I of this Comment briefly summarizes the factual and proce-
dural history of the case.13 Part II then explores the different interpre-
tations and competing policy interests courts have prioritized when 
evaluating settlement agreements that involve licensing.14 Finally, Part 
III argues that the Federal Circuit’s interpretation and the policy con-
siderations it has espoused are more aligned with today’s economy, and 
thus, the Second Circuit in Rates should have followed the Federal Cir-
cuit’s approach.15 It further recommends that courts should start en-
forcing clear and unambiguous no-challenge clauses in settlement 
agreements.16 
I. Rates Technology v. Speakeasy Emphasizes the Discovery  
of Invalid Patents 
 Rates Technology Inc. (“Rates”) owns two patents relating to cost-
based automatic routing of telephone calls.17 Around April 2007, Rates 
became aware that Speakeasy, Inc. (“Speakeasy”) was infringing on 
Rates’s patents.18 Rates has a policy of entering into settlement agree-
ments with infringing companies whereby infringing companies pay 
Rates a one-time fee to be released from liability.19 Pursuant to this poli-
cy, Rates notified Speakeasy of its infringement on Rates’s patents and 
offered to release Speakeasy from liability if Speakeasy agreed to pay.20 
Subsequently, Speakeasy paid Rates $475,000 and Rates and Speakeasy 
entered into a “Covenant Not to Sue” (“Agreement”).21 The Agreement 
                                                                                                                      
ing royalty payments, as opposed to an up-front lump sum, if they know that no-challenge 
clauses are enforceable. See Brief for the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae Sup-
porting Respondents at 3, MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007) (No. 05-
608) [hereinafter ABA Brief] (observing that allowing the licensee to challenge the patent 
while enjoying its benefits creates risk that the licensor will want to hedge against by requir-
ing a “front-loaded, non-refundable” sum in the event that the licensee challenges the patent 
and the no-challenge clause is not enforceable). Thus, the enforceability of no-challenge 
clauses affects both the terms of the licensing agreement and the types of licensees that can 
afford to pay licensing costs. See Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 3, at 974–75. 
13 See infra notes 17–32 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 33–62 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 63–89 and accompanying text. Issues relating to declaratory judg-
ments, royalty payments, and patent exhaustion are relevant to this discussion but beyond 
the scope of this Comment. 
16 See infra notes 63–89 and accompanying text. 
17 Rates, 685 F.3d at 165. 
18 Id. Speakeasy was a telecommunications company that provided broadband, voice, 
and data services to businesses. Id. It was subsequently sold to Best Buy. Id. at 166. 
19 Id. at 165. This fee is based on the company’s annual sales. Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
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included a no-challenge clause prohibiting Speakeasy from challenging 
or helping others to challenge the validity of Rates’s patents.22 Further, 
the Agreement stated that if Speakeasy violated the no-challenge clause, 
it would be liable to Rates for liquidated damages plus legal expenses.23 
 Three years later, Rates notified Covad Company, which had sub-
sequently purchased Speakeasy, that it was infringing Rates’s patent; 
Rates then offered to release Covad from liability in exchange for a 
one-time fee.24 Covad responded by filing a declaratory judgment ac-
tion against Rates in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
California on July 23, 2010, contending that the patents were invalid.25 
In response, Rates filed suit against all defendants and the defendants 
moved to dismiss.26 On May 9, 2011, the district court granted the de-
fendants’ motion, holding that the no-challenge clause was invalid be-
cause it was contrary to the public interest rationale articulated by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in the 1969 case, Lear v. Adkins.27 
 Rates appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 
contending that the district court erred in applying the public policy 
rationale stated in Lear.28 Rates argued that the district court should 
have relied instead on more recent Federal Circuit decisions that sup-
port the enforcement of no-challenge clauses.29 The Federal Circuit 
transferred the case to the Second Circuit because the case involved 
contract interpretation, not an issue pertaining to patent law, and there-
                                                                                                                      
22 Id. 
23 Rates, 685 F.3d at 165. The agreement was signed on April 30, 2007. Id. 
24 Id. at 166. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. In addition to Speakeasy, Inc., the other defendants were: Best Buy Co., Inc., 
Speakeasy Broadband Services, LLC, Megapath, Inc., Covad Communications Company, 
Covad Communications Group, Inc., CCGI Holding Corporation, and Platinum Equity 
LLC. Id. at 163. For purposes of this Comment, all defendants, with the exception of 
Speakeasy and Best Buy, are referred to as “Covad.” See infra notes 27–89 and accompany-
ing text. Rates alleged that Covad learned of the Agreement from Speakeasy, Best Buy, or 
both during due diligence. Rates, 685 F.3d at 163. Further, Rates asserted that Covad used 
this information for its declaratory judgment action against Rates. Id. Rates argued that 
Speakeasy and Best Buy breached the no-challenge clause, that Covad was liable for breach 
of contract by virtue of the merger, and thus, that all parties were jointly and severally lia-
ble for liquidated damages. Id. Three months later, Covad voluntarily dismissed its declara-
tory judgment action and then moved to dismiss. Id. 
27 Rates, 685 F.3d at 166–67; see Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670–71 (1969); MCA, 
444 F.2d at 427; infra notes 38–52 and accompanying text (discussing the policies articulat-
ed in Lear). 
28 Rates, 685 F.3d at 167. 
29 Id.; see Baseload, 619 F.3d at 1361; Flex-Foot, 238 F.3d at 1370. 
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fore was out of the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction.30 The Second Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s ruling, holding that the no-challenge clause 
was unenforceable because the policy supporting the discovery of inva-
lid patents superseded other policy considerations.31 In doing so, the 
Second Circuit distinguished Rates from prior Federal Circuit decisions 
that held that other policy goals superseded the discovery of invalid pa-
tents.32 
II. Competing Policy Considerations Governing the 
Enforceability of No-Challenge Clauses 
 In 2012, in Rates, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
followed the policy considerations raised by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
the 1969 case, Lear v. Adkins, as well as by the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit in the 1971 case, Massillon-Cleveland-Acron Sign Co. v. 
Golden State Advertising Co. (“MCA”).33 By following this line of cases, the 
Second Circuit rejected the policy considerations set forth by the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.34 Section A of this Part de-
scribes the policy considerations articulated in Lear and explores the 
ways in which different circuits have expanded Lear’s holding.35 Section 
B explains how the Federal Circuit’s approach differs from the ap-
proach taken by other circuits.36 It also explores the policy reasons un-
derlying the Federal Circuit’s divergence.37 
                                                                                                                      
30 Rates, 685 F.3d at 167; see 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (stating that 
the Federal Circuit’s appellate jurisdiction arises only when relating to patents). 
31 See Rates, 685 F.3d at 172. 
32 Compare id. at 172–74 (prioritizing the policy goal of discovering invalid patents), 
with Baseload, 619 F.3d at 1361–62 (concluding that settling litigation is the highest priority 
goal), and Flex-Foot, 238 F.3d at 1370 (determining that the policy of settling disputes 
trumps discovering invalid patents). 
33 Rates Tech. Inc. v. Speakeasy, Inc., 685 F.3d 163, 172 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 81 
U.S.L.W. 3199 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2013) (No. 12-402); see Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670–
71 (1969); Massillon-Cleveland-Acron Sign Co. v. Golden State Adver. Co. (MCA), 444 F.2d 
425, 427 (9th Cir. 1971). These are the two cases on which Rates relied most heavily for its 
analysis. See Rates, 685 F.3d at 171, 174. 
34 See Rates, 685 F.3d at 172–74; Baseload Energy, Inc. v. Roberts, 619 F.3d 1357, 1361–
62 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Flex-Foot, Inc. v. CRP, Inc., 238 F.3d 1362, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
35 See infra notes 38–52 and accompanying text. 
36 See infra notes 53–62 and accompanying text. 
37 See infra notes 53–62 and accompanying text. 
62 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 54: E. Supp. 
A. Lear and Its Expansion by Circuit Courts 
 Prior to Lear, licensee estoppel prevented licensees from challeng-
ing the validity of a patent.38 In Lear, the Supreme Court invalidated li-
censee estoppel in patent law.39 The Court reasoned that discovering 
invalid patents would encourage competition and the free exchange of 
ideas.40 Additionally, the Court concluded that these policy goals super-
seded the policy goals of contract law, including settling litigation.41 No-
tably, the parties in Lear did not include a no-challenge clause in their 
agreement.42 
 Despite the fact that Lear did not involve a no-challenge clause, 
many lower courts have stricken no-challenge clauses as void pursuant 
to the public policy concerns articulated in Lear.43 For example, in two 
cases in 1971 and 1972, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit, citing Lear, reasoned that because judicially imposed licensee es-
toppel was unenforceable, no-challenge clauses in settlement agree-
                                                                                                                      
38 See Lorelei Ritchie, Reconciling Contract Doctrine with Intellectual Property Law: An Inter-
disciplinary Solution, 25 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 105, 122–23 (2008). 
Under the doctrine of licensee estoppel, “a licensee of intellectual property ‘effectively 
recognizes the validity of that property and is estopped from contesting its validity in fu-
ture disputes.’” Lear, 395 U.S. at 167 (quoting Idaho Potato Comm’n v. M&M Produce 
Farm & Sales, 335 F.3d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
39 See Lear, 395 U.S. at 671. In Lear, the defendant, John Adkins, was hired by Lear to 
develop a product used in the aviation industry. Id. at 655. Lear paid Adkins royalties until 
Adkins’s patent application was denied for a second time. Id. at 659. When Adkins’s patent 
was later approved, he sued Lear for breach of contract. Id. at 660. The California Su-
preme Court held that the doctrine of estoppel barred Lear from questioning the patent’s 
validity. Adkins v. Lear, Inc., 435 P.2d 321, 336 (1968), rev’d, 395 U.S. 653 (1969); see Lear, 
395 U.S. at 661. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the California Supreme Court. Lear, 395 
U.S. at 661. 
40 Lear, 395 U.S. at 670. Encouraging competition and the free exchange of ideas are 
policies that help enable the progress of science and the useful arts as prescribed by the 
Constitution. See U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
41 Lear, 395 U.S. at 670–71. The Court stated: 
Surely the equities of the licensor do not weigh very heavily when they are 
balanced against the important public interest in permitting full and free 
competition in the use of ideas which are in reality a part of the public do-
main. . . . We think it plain that the technical requirements of contract doc-
trine must give way before the demands of the public interest in the typical 
situation involving the negotiation of a license after a patent has issued. 
Id. 
42 See Alfaro, supra note 12, at 1287–88 (noting that the agreement did not include a 
no-challenge clause); William C. Rooklidge, Licensee Validity Challenges and the Obligation to 
Pay Accrued Royalties: Lear v. Adkins Revisited (Part 1), 68 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 
506, 537 (1986) (noting that the Court did not rule on no-challenge clauses). 
43 See, e.g., Panther Pumps & Equip. Co. v. Hydrocraft, Inc., 468 F.2d 225, 231 (7th Cir. 
1972); MCA, 444 F.2d at 427; Bendix Corp. v. Balax, Inc., 421 F.2d 809, 821 (7th Cir. 1970). 
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ments also would be unenforceable.44 The U.S. District Courts for the 
Eastern District of Virginia, the Middle District of Florida, and the Dis-
trict of Columbia all have come to similar conclusions based on the 
same reasoning.45 
 The Ninth Circuit employed similar reasoning in 1971, in MCA, 
and held that a settlement agreement restricting the ability to chal-
lenge patent validity was unenforceable.46 The court reasoned that no-
challenge clauses conflict with federal patent policy, just like licensee 
estoppel.47 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit determined that it did not 
matter that MCA involved a settlement agreement rather than a licens-
ing agreement as in Lear.48 The court reasoned that making this distinc-
tion would allow parties to “couch licensing agreements in the form of 
settlement agreements.”49 Finally, the court stated that policies favoring 
sharing ideas and discovering invalid patents supersede the policy fa-
voring settling disputes, even if those policies hinder expedient settle-
ment.50 
 In Rates, the Second Circuit was persuaded by the reasoning in 
MCA, and, accordingly, held that enforcing no-challenge clauses in pre-
litigation settlement agreements would undermine the policy of discov-
ering invalid patents.51 Acknowledging that the high cost of patent liti-
gation may support no-challenge clauses, the Second Circuit nonethe-
less reasoned that these policy considerations were less important than 
the policy of discovering invalid patents.52 
                                                                                                                      
44 See Panther Pumps, 468 F.2d at 231; Bendix, 421 F.2d at 821. 
45 Callaway Golf Co. v. Kappos, 802 F. Supp. 2d 678, 687 (E.D. Va. 2011) (“[The plaintiff 
has not] demonstrated that the public interest in enforcement of settlement agreements 
outweighs the public interest in patent validity.”); Mayo Clinic Jacksonville v. Alzheimer’s 
Inst., 683 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (“[T]he no-challenge clause, which gravi-
tates against patent policy in a manner reminiscent of Lear, receives the strict construction 
warranted by a provision that constrains a constitutional, statutory, or other legal right.”); 
Robintech, Inc. v. Chemidus Wavin, Ltd., 450 F. Supp. 817, 821 (D.D.C. 1978) (“[N]o-contest 
clauses indubitably are unenforceable against the licensee under Lear, Inc. v. Adkins . . . .”). 
46 See MCA, 444 F.2d at 427. MCA accused Golden State of patent infringement and 
the parties entered into a settlement agreement, which included a no-challenge clause and 
liquidated damages. Id. at 425. Later, MCA accused Golden State of infringement and 
breach of the settlement agreement. Id. at 426. One of the co-defendants raised patent 
invalidity as an affirmative defense, which the lower court denied, holding that the case 
involved breach of contract, not patent infringement. Id. The Ninth Circuit addressed 
whether the express covenant was unenforceable in light of Lear. Id. 
47 See id. at 427. 
48 See id. 
49 See id. 
50 See id. 
51 See Rates, 685 F.3d at 171–72. 
52 See id. at 172. 
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B. The Federal Circuit’s Divergence from Other Circuits 
 In contrast to the priority other circuits have given to discovering 
invalid patents and freely exchanging ideas, the Federal Circuit has 
emphasized other policy concerns when evaluating settlement agree-
ments, including those of res judicata and enforcing settlement agree-
ments.53 Two recent Federal Circuit cases support the position that no-
challenge clauses in settlement agreements should be enforceable.54 
 In 2001, in Flex-Foot, Inc. v. CRP, Inc., the Federal Circuit held that a 
licensee was contractually estopped from challenging patent validity.55 
The parties had entered into a settlement agreement while a motion for 
summary judgment ruling was pending and after both sides had con-
ducted discovery.56 The court reasoned that the policy of settling dis-
putes trumped the policy of encouraging the free exchange of ideas.57 
 A decade later, in the 2010 case, Baseload Energy, Inc. v. Roberts, the 
Federal Circuit expanded its Flex-Foot reasoning by holding that “clear 
and unambiguous” language in settlement agreements, including no-
challenge clauses, was enforceable even if there had been no prior liti-
gation.58 The court followed the reasoning of Flex-Foot regarding no-
challenge clauses, stating that Lear does not bar no-challenge clauses 
                                                                                                                      
53 See id.; Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 483 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that the 
principle of res judicata supersedes federal patent policy in consent decrees); Hemstreet v. 
Spiegel, Inc., 851 F.2d 348, 351 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that the defendant could not rely 
on federal patent policy to avoid making payments to which it agreed pursuant to a settle-
ment agreement); Panther Pumps, 468 F.2d at 231; MCA, 444 F.2d at 427; Bendix, 421 F.2d at 
821. 
54 See Baseload, 619 F.3d at 1363; Flex-Foot, 238 F.3d at 1370. 
55 See 238 F.3d at 1370. 
56 See id. After Flex-Foot and Springlite settled a patent infringement claim, Springlite 
brought suit seeking a declaration that Flex-Foot’s patent was invalid. Id. at 1363. The par-
ties conducted discovery, fully briefed a motion for summary judgment, and while the 
motion was pending, the parties entered into another settlement agreement, which in-
cluded a no-challenge clause. Id. at 1363–64. Later, Flex-Foot alleged that Springlite in-
fringed on Flex-Foot’s patent, and Springlite tried to raise patent invalidity as a defense. Id. 
57 See id. at 1370. The Second Circuit distinguished Rates from Flex-Foot on the ground 
that the parties in Rates did not have an opportunity to conduct discovery. See Rates, 685 
F.3d at 172; Flex-Foot, 238 F.3d at 1370. 
58 Baseload, 619 F.3d at 1363; see Flex-Foot, 238 F.3d at 1370. In Baseload, the plaintiff, 
Baseload Energy, Inc., entered into a settlement agreement with the patent holder that 
included a provision stating that Baseload would “forever release and discharge [the pa-
tent holder] . . . of and from any and all losses, liabilities, claims, expenses, demands and 
causes of action of every kind and nature.” Baseload, 619 F.3d at 1359. The Federal Circuit 
held that even if invalidity claims have not been litigated, the no-challenge clause may still 
be enforceable. Id. at 1363. Here, however, because the language of the settlement agree-
ment was not clear and unambiguous, the Federal Circuit allowed the defendant to raise 
patent invalidity as a defense. Id. 
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from being enforceable because there is a strong jurisprudential policy 
in favor of settling litigation.59 Moreover, the court distinguished Lear on 
the ground that Lear did not reach the issue of no-challenge clauses.60 
Thus, the Federal Circuit has diverged from other circuit courts by up-
holding settlement agreements as long as they are clear and unambigu-
ous.61 This approach furthers the policy goals of encouraging and en-
forcing settlement agreements.62 
III. Why the Second Circuit in Rates Should Have Adopted the 
Federal Circuit’s Approach 
 The Federal Circuit’s approach that clear and unambiguous set-
tlement agreements should be enforced is preferable to the approach 
taken by the Second Circuit in Rates.63 In Rates, the Second Circuit re-
lied on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in the 1969 case, Lear v. Adkins, 
to hold that no-challenge clauses are unenforceable; Lear, however, did 
not address no-challenge clauses, and thus was not binding on this is-
sue.64 Moreover, the Federal Circuit’s approach is better aligned with 
the realities of today’s economy.65 In today’s rapidly expanding global 
economy, the United States is no longer in the same position of power 
it was when the Supreme Court decided Lear.66 In the late 1960s, the 
United States was an “unchallenged economic powerhouse” that did 
not have to compete with other developing economic blocs like it does 
today.67 Because of the increase in competition, there is now a more 
                                                                                                                      
59 See Baseload, 619 F.3d at 1361. 
60 See id. In Rates, the Second Circuit chose to disregard Baseload, dismissing the Feder-
al Circuit’s analysis on the matter of no-challenge clauses as dicta from another federal 
court of appeal. See Rates, 685 F.3d at 173–74. 
61 See Baseload, 619 F.3d at 1363; Flex-Foot, 238 F.3d at 1370. 
62 See Baseload, 619 F.3d at 1363; Flex-Foot, 238 F.3d at 1370. 
63 See  Rates Tech. Inc. v. Speakeasy, Inc., 685 F.3d 163, 171–72 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 
81 U.S.L.W. 3199 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2013) (No. 12-402); Baseload Energy, Inc. v. Roberts, 619 F.3d 
1357, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Flex-Foot, Inc. v. CRP, Inc., 238 F.3d 1362, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
Notably, the Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent matters. See 28 
U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). This puts it in the best position to make deter-
minations regarding the policies that should control patent issues. See id. 
64 See Rates, 685 F.3d at 171–72; Alfaro, supra note 12, at 1287–88 (noting that the 
agreement did not include a no-challenge clause); Rooklidge, supra note 42, at 237 (not-
ing that the Court did not rule on no-challenge clauses). 
65 See Baseload, 619 F.3d at 1361; Flex-Foot, 238 F.3d at 1370. 
66 See Taylor, supra note 4, at 218–19, 228 (arguing that Lear and its progeny hinder in-
novation, causing the United States to fall behind other countries). 
67 Treadway, supra note 3, at 325. The United States has fallen behind many countries 
in global competitiveness. Klaus Schwab, World Econ. Forum, The Global Com-
petiveness Report: 2012-2013, at 21 (2012), available at http://www3.weforum.org/docs/ 
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pressing need to provide inventors with incentives to invest in research 
and development.68 In this increasingly competitive global landscape, 
the United States needs to capitalize on innovation by enforcing no-
challenge clauses, which reduce the cost and time required to recoup 
inventors’ investment costs.69 
 Specifically, the Federal Circuit’s approach to enforcing no-chal-
lenge clauses recognizes that for the United States to capitalize on 
technological advancements, patent holders need to be able to recoup 
research and development costs by licensing their patents to third par-
ties.70 When licensees are able to challenge inventors’ patents, licensors 
assume the risk that there is a higher likelihood their patents will be 
invalidated.71 Consequently, patent holders are more likely to increase 
up-front costs, possibly requiring the full price of the license to be paid 
up front, to hedge against the risk of invalidation by licensees later.72 
When licensees lack the capital to pay higher up-front fees, fewer li-
censing agreements are formed, which makes it harder for inventors to 
recoup their costs.73 As a result, if patent holders cannot hedge against 
their patents being invalidated by licensees, both licensors and licen-
sees are in a worse position than if they were able to negotiate a no-
challenge clause.74 On the other hand, because no-challenge clauses 
                                                                                                                      
WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2012-13.pdf. According to the World Economic Fo-
rum’s Global Competitiveness Report for 2012–2013, the United States currently ranks twenty-
ninth in intellectual property protection, thirty-fifth in efficiency of legal framework in set-
tling disputes, thirty-seventh in efficiency of legal framework in challenging regulations, and 
fourteenth in availability of latest technologies. Id. at 389, 397–98, 488. Further, the United 
States currently ranks seventh in capacity for innovation, seventh in company spending on 
research and development, and twelfth in number of applications filed under the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty. Id. at 512, 514, 518. 
68 See Taylor, supra note 4, at 217–19 (asserting that shifts in technology and process 
innovation require the United States to compete more efficiently with other nations by 
strengthening its capacity to commercialize and protect innovations). 
69 See Schwab, supra note 67, at 389, 397–98, 488; Treadway, supra note 3, at 303–04 
(noting that when patent holders are able to license patents effectively on favorable terms, 
it takes less time for inventors to recoup their invested funds, thereby quickening the pro-
cess of generating funds for new innovations). 
70 See Treadway, supra note 3, at 303–04 (stating that the patent holder’s monopoly is 
the primary means of recouping the money used to create the invention worthy of patent 
protection). 
71 See Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 3, at 974–75; Treadway, supra note 3, at 303–04. 
72 See ABA Brief, supra note 14, at 3. 
73 See Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 3, at 974–75. This is especially troublesome in emerg-
ing sectors, like bioinformatics, that require considerable research and development. Id. In 
emerging sectors, where the value of inventions is hard to calculate at the outset, royalties are 
a more efficient way of assessing the invention’s continued worth. Id. 
74 See id.; Treadway, supra note 3, at 324. 
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allow patent holders to hedge against risk and recoup costs, inventors 
who know the clauses will be enforced are more likely to lower licens-
ing fees and less likely to require up-front payments that licensees may 
not have the capital to pay.75 Thus, no-challenge clauses make the li-
censing process less risky because licensors have more incentive to con-
tinue innovating.76 
 Moreover, the Federal Circuit’s approach allows for freedom of 
contract to protect the public’s interest efficiently.77 Although freedom 
of contract may limit the public’s exposure to the free exchange of ide-
as in the short term, decreased licensing costs will provide more inno-
vation on the whole, allowing consumers to access more inventions in 
the long term.78 By allowing unrestricted negotiations, parties are able 
to form agreements based on business factors that are out of the court’s 
control.79 For example, the terms of a settlement agreement implicitly 
reflect the likelihood that the patent would be successfully invalidated 
as well as the patent’s potential value.80 Both licensors and licensees 
benefit from courts enforcing these agreements, as licensors will be in-
centivized to continue innovating and licensees will pay lower licensing 
fees.81 Thus, decreased licensing fees reduce downstream costs, benefit-
                                                                                                                      
75 See ABA Brief, supra note 12, at 3; Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 3, at 974–75. 
76 See Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 3, at 974–75. 
77 See Goldstucker, supra note 5, at 154–56. Voiding no-challenge clauses in settlement 
agreements also leads to an increase in an inventor’s desire to turn to trade secret protec-
tion instead of patent protection as a means for protecting innovation. Id. at 157. Trade 
secret protection limits disclosure and licensing, thereby undermining patent law’s goal of 
encouraging the free exchange of ideas. See U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; Aronson v. Quick 
Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (“[P]atent law . . . promotes disclosure of inven-
tions, to stimulate further innovation and to permit the public to practice the invention 
once the patent expires.”). 
78 Cf. Treadway, supra note 3, at 324–25 (stating that alternatively, under the Second 
Circuit’s reasoning, higher licensing costs would be passed on to the consumer, “diminish-
ing the benefit the public currently receives from the patent system”). 
79 See In re Mahurkar Double Lumen Hemodialysis Catheter Patent Litig., 831 F. Supp. 
1354, 1397 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (“The actual market beats judicial attempts to mimic the mar-
ket every time . . . .”). 
80 See Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 3, at 988 (asserting that if potential licensees knew 
that they could not challenge the patent’s validity after entering into a settlement agree-
ment and they thought the patent was weak, licensees could opt to negotiate for lower 
payment terms). 
81 See Michael Risch, Patent Challenges and Royalty Inflation, 85 Ind. L.J. 1003, 1004 
(2010). Licensees will pay a lower price because patent holders will not have to charge a 
premium to cover anticipated litigation costs in defending their patents against the licen-
see. See id. 
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ting consumers in the form of lower prices and more technological ad-
vancements.82 
 Conversely, the Second Circuit’s decision to invalidate no-chal-
lenge clauses for public policy reasons has created real problems not 
only for innovative activity but also for business planning.83 Because the 
Federal Circuit has taken a different approach than the Second, Sev-
enth, and Ninth Circuits, it is unsettled whether no-challenge clauses are 
enforceable.84 As a result, parties entering into a settlement agreement 
are unable to determine accurately what the specific terms should be, 
including, most importantly, the licensing fee.85 Specifically, the inclu-
sion of an enforceable no-challenge clause will decrease the cost of the 
license, whereas if no-challenge clauses are void, the price of the license 
will increase to compensate for increased risk.86 Because circuits differ 
on whether no-challenge clauses are valid, businesses are less able to 
plan for the future, which hinders their ability to conduct business 
transactions effectively.87 Courts should recognize that spurring innova-
tion is the largest policy concern in today’s global economic landscape.88 
Therefore, courts should resolve the uncertainty in favor of the Federal 
Circuit’s approach and begin enforcing no-challenge clauses.89 
Conclusion 
 Since the Supreme Court’s 1969 decision in Lear, federal courts 
have disagreed as to the enforceability of no-challenge clauses in set-
tlement agreements. Many courts, including the Second Circuit in 
Rates, have determined that the policies articulated in Lear, which en-
courage the free exchange of ideas and discovery of invalid patents, 
supersede the policy of settling litigation. These courts are misguided. 
In Rates, the Second Circuit should have instead followed the Federal 
Circuit’s reasoning, which prioritizes the policy of encouraging dispute 
settlement. The Federal Circuit’s approach is better aligned with the 
                                                                                                                      
82 See Goldstucker, supra note 5, at 156. 
83 Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual Property? A Classical Liberal Re-
sponse to a Premature Obituary, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 455, 502 (2010). 
84 See id. 
85 See id. 
86 See Goldstucker, supra note 5, at 138. 
87 See Epstein, supra note 83, at 502. 
88 See Schwab, supra note 67, at 389, 397–98, 488; Epstein, supra note 83, at 502. 
89 See Treadway, supra note 3, at 303–04. Although the Federal Circuit has not yet ruled 
on whether no-challenge clauses are enforceable in pre-litigation settlement agreements, 
the policy goals expressed in Flex-Foot and Baseload support enforcing no-challenge clauses. 
See Baseload, 619 F.3d at 1361–62; Flex-Foot, 238 F.3d at 1370. 
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realities of modern business, as it encourages sophisticated parties to 
negotiate settlement terms based on the strength and value of a partic-
ular patent. This policy promotes innovation and benefits the public 
through lower prices and increased access to technological advance-
ments. Thus, courts should adopt the Federal Circuit’s approach and 
hold that clear and unambiguous no-challenge clauses in pre-litigation 
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